Abstract-Using reconfigurable static random access memory (SRAM)-based field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) for space-based computation has been a very active area of research for the past decade. Because these commercially available devices are only radiation tolerant in terms of total ionizing dose and single-event latchup, these devices must be qualified for other types of single-event effects to be used in spacecraft. Furthermore, mission requirements often dictate the need to do radiation experiments on the FPGA user circuit. Because both the circuit and the circuit's state are stored in memory that is susceptible to single-event upsets, both could be altered by the harsh space radiation environment. Both the circuit and the circuit's state can be protected by triple-modular redundancy (TMR), but applying TMR to FPGA user designs is often an error-prone process. Faulty application of TMR could cause the FPGA user circuit to output incorrect data. This paper will describe both device-level static testing and user circuit dynamic testing, including a three-tiered methodology for testing FPGA user designs for space readiness.
I. INTRODUCTION
F IELD-PROGRAMMABLE gate array (FPGA) technology, such as the Xilinx Virtex family of devices, has made inroads into space-based platforms over the past decade [1] , [2] . These devices have programmable logic and routing that are used to implement user circuits and are well suited for the DSP algorithms that are often used in space. Unlike radiationhardened antifuse FPGAs that can only be programmed once, radiation-tolerant devices can be programmed an unlimited number of times. The ability to reconfigure the device to implement new circuits makes static random access memory (SRAM) FPGAs attractive to the space community. Unlike other hardware devices that have the circuit fabricated into the silicon, new circuits can be implemented on an FPGA while in orbit. Therefore, reconfiguration can extend the usable lifetime of the system by changing the FPGA's user circuit to meet changing mission and science goals. We have also found that reconfiguration opens up many avenues for prelaunch testing of the user circuits. Unfortunately, the technology used in these SRAM FPGAs to implement the user circuit is susceptible to radiation-induced faults, called single-event upsets (SEUs) , that can affect the programmable logic and routing or affect the entire device. To adequately qualify an SRAM-based FPGA for space, the device is tested both statically and dynamically in a cyclotron so that radiation-induced faults can be identified, characterized, and quantified. Static radiation tests involve testing the entire device to determine the sensitivity of the device to radiation-induced faults, which is called the cross section. This information is used to determine the error rate of the device while in orbit. Dynamic testing measures the sensitivity of an FPGA design to radiation-induced faults. In this case, input and output test vectors are used to determine whether radiation-induced faults cause the design to output erroneous data. The results of dynamic testing is used to determine whether a particular design meets mission requirements.
In this paper, we will present methodologies for both static and dynamic testing. In Section II, we provide information that affects both static and dynamic testing. In Section III, we will present a methodology for statically testing SRAMbased FPGA devices that will allow the tester to determine the sensitivity of the device to radiation-induced upsets. In Section IV, we will present a three-tiered methodology that uses all of these technologies for discovering design flaws in an FPGA user circuit before launch. Section IV is a continuation of the author's paper at AUTOTESTCON 2008 [3] . In both Sections III and IV, we will present results from using these methodologies on Xilinx Virtex family devices. Given the disparate nature of these topics, the related work for these topics will be covered in the individual sections.
II. BACKGROUND ON RADIATION TESTING
All electronic devices that will be used in a spacecraft need to be qualified for the space environment, which includes 0018-9456/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE radiation, thermal, and mechanical testing. There are a variety of references and standards for qualifying devices for space usage. The papers [4] and [5] will be useful for a discussion of thermal design and testing. For radiation testing, readers will find the Handbook of Radiation Effects [6] and EIA/JEDEC standards 57 and 89 helpful. Given the scope of this paper, we will only focus on radiation testing.
The space environment has a very rich radiation environment of electrons, protons, and heavy ions. Each orbit is characterized by an ion spectrum, where each ion has a corresponding energy spectrum. Each ion also affects semiconductor devices in different ways. Electrons and protons cause the switching characteristics of transistors to degrade, which are called dose-related effects. Protons and heavy ions cause single-event effects (SEEs). While Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs have not exhibited dose-related effects, some types of SEEs can make these parts challenging to use in space.
SEEs is an umbrella term that covers several different types of radiation effects. Most commonly, spacecraft designers are concerned with single-event latchup (SEL), single-event transients (SETs), SEUs, and single-event functional interrupts (SEFIs). While there are a handful of SEE types that can damage a device, SEL is the predominant concern in this category. The remaining three SEE mechanisms discussed in this paper are not destructive, but they can make fault-tolerant computation challenging. These phenomena are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Due to the destructive effects of SEL or latchup, spacecraft designers often disqualify devices that latchup from spacecraft. SEL is a radiation-induced version of latchup that plagues CMOS devices and can be destructive to SEL-sensitive devices. Unlike most SRAM-based FPGAs, Xilinx has published several reports verifying latchup immunity [7] , [8] , which has made it the preferred choice for space usage.
Radiation-induced faults from SEUs, which are also known as bit flips or upsets, cause memory bits to change value from either 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. SEUs are the primary concern for SRAMbased FPGAs in space. SEUs in FPGAs have been shown to cause problems in the programmable logic, the programmable routing, and even device control [9] , [10] . SEUs that affect the device control are considered SEFIs. SEFIs in orbit can have serious consequences, as the device usually needs to be completely reprogrammed and the calculation needs to be restarted to recover from many SEFIs. In practice, SEFI error rates are very low. More concerning, SEUs can change circuit functionality and circuit state in the FPGA user circuit.
In comparison, SETs (or transients) are less troublesome. Transients are common in many semiconductor circuits. With this phenomenon, the ionizing particle causes a transient current state. If this transient state can propagate to a register during the setup and hold time (called the window of vulnerability), the transient will be latched (called a latched SET), and the intermediate data value could be corrupted. For modern CMOS devices with fast clock speeds, latched SETs have become increasingly more common, and distinguishing transients from legitimate signals is challenging. Unlike SEUs, latched SETs have a radiation-induced error rate that is dependent on the circuit's operating speed as faster clock speeds are more likely to latch SETs than slower clock speeds. For SRAM-based FPGAs, where the user flip-flops are outnumbered by several orders of magnitude by the configuration memory, the current understanding is that SETs are possible, but the observability of SETs is hindered by the number of SEUs.
There are also a number of compound reliability effects that could affect the sensitivity of the device to radiation, including temperature and voltage. In particular, lowering voltages has been shown to increase the cross section in SRAM [11] , [12] . Temperature-related reliability problems can also be easily misinterpreted as radiation-induced faults. We tested all devices at nominal temperature and voltages so that we have a consistent basis of comparison over the different devices.
III. STATIC TESTING
In this section, we will describe how we have done static testing of the Xilinx Virtex devices. This section covers our methodology toward testing, our analysis methods, and the highlights of our results. This section concludes with a short discussion of how these results are used in determining the error rate for these devices in space.
A. Methodology
Static testing of the device provides a basis for determining the device's on-orbit error rate and the device's sensitivity to SEUs and SEFIs. We start by first experimentally determining the proton and heavy-ion static cross sections. The basic methodology for static radiation experiments of electronic devices involves irradiating the device and counting the number of radiation-induced faults. The equation for determining the device cross section is
where fluence is the measure of the number of ions that irradiated the device in a set at a time, θ is the angle of the test fixture to the beam, and events is the count of the radiation-induced faults. Some people prefer to use the bit cross section, which is determined by taking the value from (1) and dividing it by the number of bits in the device. This basic methodology is implemented in one of two ways: 1) complete capture and 2) continuous capture. The flowcharts for these two methodologies are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. There are advantages and disadvantages to both methodologies. The complete capture has the advantages of being able to easily determine the amount of fluence per sample and the easiest to implement, but it involves a lot of time-consuming human interactions per sample. The continuous capture system records several samples for each beam run with far less human interactions but determining the amount of fluence per sample is more complicated. We have found that the use of a custom test fixture that implements the continuous capture test methodology has been very useful in quickly determining the static cross section.
1) Test Fixtures:
An important aspect of testing devices is the test fixtures. The fixture consists of both hardware and software components. The hardware test fixture provides support for reading (readback) and writing (programming) the configuration data in the SRAM-based FPGA. The software test fixture implements the FPGA-specific part of the test methodology, including controlling programming and reading back the FPGA. In this section, we will discuss both the hardware and software aspects of test fixtures.
There are a number of hardware test fixtures that organizations have built to test FPGAs [8] , [13] , [14] . While using the Xilinx AFX series development boards is possible, many organizations have been designing their own boards. The most common design for these boards is to use one or more FPGAs to control the FPGA being irradiated. Test fixtures also differ in how the FPGA is programmed and readback, as there are two ports available on the Xilinx Virtex parts. The JTAG port, while an industry standard, is the slowest port. As the other port, i.e., SelectMAP, is significantly faster than the JTAG port, it is the most frequently used port for custom test fixtures.
The hardware test fixture used in this paper for the Virtex-5 results is shown in Fig. 3 and uses two nominally biased Xilinx AFX series development boards (one Virtex-II and one Virtex-5). The Virtex-II board communicates to the host computer through a USB card and controls the Virtex-5 board during irradiation. A similar test fixture was built for the Virtex-4 devices by using the Xilinx AFX series development boards for the Virtex-4. The Virtex-II device can be tested by using only the Virtex-II AFX development board. As this hardware test fixture is very heavily software controlled, we have found that this setup very quickly modifies to new devices.
The software test fixture at a minimum must program and readback the FPGA being irradiated. Oftentimes, the software test fixture will also difference the readback data with the programming data to determine the locations of SEUs in the readback data. There is a commercially available tool from Xilinx, called iMPACT, that can do the programming, the reading back, and the differencing. Unfortunately, this program was only designed to work with the JTAG port. Because the reading back and differencing takes so long, this software can only effectively be used for complete capture test methodologies. Due to this limitation, most organizations develop custom software. The previously discussed hardware test fixture uses custom software that performs programming, differencing, and readback, as well as keeping the GUI updated with minimal statistics to help the testers determine whether the test fixture remains operational. The FPGA is completely reprogrammed, and the differential bitstream is saved to the hard drive every second in this scheme, which allows us to continuously test at high fluences without accumulating too many upsets per readback. We can collect approximately 3600 differential readbacks per hour. Minimal statistics are taken in real time while irradiating the part as a state-of-health check. As a final note on test fixtures, developing test fixtures that can record and identify SEFIs is very difficult. Not only do most SEFIs make the device being irradiated completely nonfunctional, but the information that can be gained from the irradiated device is very similar for many of the different types of SEFIs. Oftentimes, the only way a tester knows that a SEFI has occurred on the device is that the test fixture cannot establish communication with the irradiated device or the test fixture crashes. The test fixtures used in [8] and [13] currently have the best methodologies for testing FPGAs for SEFIs.
2) Angular Testing: Oftentimes, testers will angle the text fixture to the beam during testing. For older electronic devices, angular testing was done as a way to artificially increase the beam energy, thereby increasing the number of discrete data points that could be collected. Paradoxically, as ions move through silicon, the energy of the ion will increase until the stopping range is met at the Bragg's peak. The deposited energy beyond the Bragg's peak of the ion is zero. Therefore, one way to increase the ion's energy is to increase the ion's path through the device, which can be done by angling the device to the beam. For angular testing, the ions' path between the surface of the device and the active volume of the semiconductor is
where distance normal is the length between the surface of the device and the active volume of the device, and θ is the angle of the test fixture to the beam. This increase in energy is
where Energy normal is the energy of the beam at a normal incidence, and θ is the angle of the test fixture to the beam. Care needs to be taken with angular testing to make sure that ions are not shadowed by the device's socket or that the distance angle does not exceed the ion's range. In both cases, the data will not be consistent with the rest of the data set.
We have found that rotating Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs in the beam provides an interesting data set. Unlike traditional electronics devices, these devices are heterogeneously laid out with many different types of memory cells. Therefore, rotating the device creates an effect that cannot be explained by only the increase in effective energy. To study these effects, we rotated the device in two different directions, as shown in Fig. 4 , to change the beam's angle of incidence. Since the device is columnar in nature, we tested the response when the columns were upright (θ = 0) and when the columns were on their side (θ = 90). Next, the beam's angle of incidence φ was changed by slanting the device relative to the beam. Several different φ's were tested for both θ's to get an idea of how the angular effects changed the radiation characteristics.
3) MBU Testing: We are particularly interested in the role of multiple-bit upsets (MBUs) in these devices. MBUs are caused when a single ionizing particle causes multiple bits to change values. For triple-modular redundancy (TMR)-protected designs, MBUs often violate the assumption that only one error exists in the system at a time and have been proven to cause TMR defeats in the Virtex-II [15] . Therefore, we often analyze our static data for MBUs.
We have found that it is possible to create MBUs from coincident single-bit upsets (SBUs) if the fluence per sample is too high. As coincident SBUs are indistinguishable from MBUs, limiting their ability to contaminate a data set is necessary for MBU analysis. To determine the quality of our data collection procedures, we have looked at three ways to determine the rate of coincident SBUs in the data set: 1) shape analysis; 2) statistical analysis; and 3) Monte Carlo analysis. The first attempt at determining and potentially removing coincident SBUs from our data sets focused on analyzing the MBU shapes under the assumption that coincident SBUs were more likely to create "irregularly" shaped MBUs. Analysis of data sets with a low likelihood of having coincident SBUs showed that some of the "irregularly" shaped MBUs were, in fact, common. Therefore, we have not found it possible to remove coincident SBUs from data sets by shape.
To this end, we try to bound the amount of coincident SBUs through statistical analysis and Monte Carlo analysis. Rigorous statistical analysis of coincident SBUs is difficult given the prevalence of naturally created MBUs and the complexity of the problem. As a worst-case analysis, we assume that all of the upsets in a readback are SBUs and try to determine the percentage of two-bit MBUs that are from coincident SBUs. If the first ion upsets location L 0 , the probability that the second ion upsets a bit in the adjacency neighborhood of L 0 is
As there are N combinations of L 0 on an N -bit device, the probability of a coincident SBU on the second upset is
For three upsets, the probability expands to
Similar reasoning is possible until the general equation for an upper bound for k upsets, where one upset is a coincident SBU, is arrived upon, i.e.,
Clearly, from this equation, as the number of upsets k per readback increases, the percentage of coincident SBUs increases. Given the complexity of this equation, we have found that Monte Carlo simulations are very useful. For these simulations, we generate m random upsets for the bitstream and then analyze the random upsets using our analysis software described in Section III-B2 to determine whether coincident SBUs have created MBUs. We generate and analyze millions of samples in this manner for each device. These simulations have shown that the worst-case statistical analysis was approximately a factor of 2-10 higher than Monte Carlo simulations, but still quite reasonable.
One thing that is hard to reconcile with the probability of coincident SBUs is how to adjust the beam in accordance to MBU rates. We have found that there is a correlation of the ion's energy and the angle of the beam to the likelihood of MBUs. Therefore, as the energy and the angle increase, the likelihood that an MBU occurs increases, and the probability of a coincident SBU is less important within reason. For low-energy normal incidence testing, it is more necessary to limit the number of upsets per sample than for higher energy angular data sets. 
4) Micro-SEFIs:
One final methodology concern is a not completely understood phenomenon that affects the Xilinx Virtex family parts, which we call the micro-SEFI for lack of better terminology. What appears to be happening in the micro-SEFI is that some number of programming bits are locally reconfigured as if the configuration control logic has been upset. The bits that are upset present in the analysis as unusually large MBUs and can wreck havoc on analysis, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section. Since this phenomenon is certainly not an actual MBU and likely not caused by an SEU in the programming data, we eliminate these samples from the data set. To simplify data cleansing, we test with either many more or many less upsets per readback than present in the micro-SEFI so that the micro-SEFIcontaminated data samples can easily be eliminated. For example, if the micro-SEFI presents with approximately 300 upsets per sample, then we test at either greater than 500 upsets per sample or less than 100 upset per readback. To minimize problems with both the micro-SEFIs and coincident SBUs, we recommend testing at less than 100 upsets per readback.
B. Analysis
The analysis of our data sets takes three distinct phases. First, data sets must be cleansed from micro-SEFIs and SEFIs. Second, analysis of the data correlates upsets to physical locations to determine the percentage of MBUs and distribution of upsets by memory cell type. Finally, all of the data sets are combined to create plots of the sensitivity by energy.
1) Data Cleansing:
Once the data were collected, the data need to be cleansed to remove both the micro-SEFIcontaminated and the SEFI-contaminated data sets. An entire run of data taken on our continuous capture test system for the Xilinx Virtex-5 device at Texas A&M University's cyclotron for 15 MeV/u argon is shown in Fig. 5 . Eliminating SEFIcontaminated data samples is simple, because the number of upsets is significantly greater than the average number of upsets for a sample. In Fig. 6 , the SEFIs have been removed from the data set, but the micro-SEFIs remain in the data set. In this figure, it is fairly easy to see the micro-SEFI data points as they have far more upsets per sample than the rest of the samples. In Fig. 6 these data points are boxed in dark gray. The data in the lighter gray box are suspect data that could be either eliminated or kept based on the testers' desires.
Statistically removing the micro-SEFI-contaminated samples is very difficult, and removing micro-SEFIs by hand is timeconsuming. While originally a running average was used to determine whether samples should be eliminated, we found that a custom jackknifing algorithm was more useful. The beam fluctuations due to the flux drifting and the Poisson statistics that determine the arrival of upsets meant that the running average had either too small or too large of a standard deviation. The result was that either nearly all of the data were eliminated or none of the data were eliminated. As jackknifing algorithms look at small contiguous windows of data to determine whether a statistical outlier exists in the window, this methodology worked better with the beam fluctuations [16] . Some experimentation was necessary to determine the optimal window size, as the prevalence of micro-SEFIs has increased for each generation of device. In addition, we found it advantageous to accept all of the data from window when the jackknifed standard deviation was below ten upsets. Higher standard deviations often indicated that statistical outliers existed within the window.
The jackknifed data set is shown in Fig. 7 . One can see that all of the micro-SEFIs have been removed. Some of the data in the middle group were accepted. In particular, the samples from the beam variation around the 800th sample were kept. Since that cluster of potentially bad data would be processed in the same window, removing the potentially bad data through jackknifing is impossible. Since there is no way to prove from just the number of upsets that the data are bad, the data are accepted. If the data turn out to have other characteristics indicating data corruption, the samples will be removed by the second phase of analysis. As it stands, the initial run had 1264 samples: 32 samples were removed through jackknifing, and 1232 samples remained. Therefore, jackknifing removed only 2.5% of the total data set and removed 100% of all of the micro-SEFIs.
2) Physical Correlation and Analysis: After jackknifing the data, the data set can be analyzed. We separately analyze each sample and then aggregate the samples for one beam run into one data point. Combining data from separate beam runs is not recommended, although it is always possible to average data points together. Data from separate sources, energy, or angles should always be analyzed as separate data points. In the next section, there is a discussion of how to combine data points into graphs.
The first step of analyzing the data is to translate the upset patterns from the readback data to the physical layout of the programming data. We use the physical layout to classify adjacent upset bits and their affected resources. We classify a bit as adjacent to another if it lies within one of the eight neighboring memory cells surrounding that bit. Fig. 8(a) illustrates the adjacency neighborhood used. Adjacent upsets are classified as MBUs. In Fig. 8(b) , three upset bits are grouped together in a single MBU. This way, maximally sized MBUs are found to give an understanding of the size of MBU events.
The location of each SBU and MBU is recorded to determine what FPGA resources are affected and the frequency of SBUs and MBUs by memory cell type. Fig. 9 shows a block diagram of the Virtex-II family. This layout is similar to the layout for the other families tested. There are many different types of memory cells in these devices. We have broken down our analysis into five types of resources: 1) input/output blocks (IOBs); 2) configurable logic blocks (CLBs); 3) BlockRAM (BRAM); 4) BlockRAM interconnect (BRAMi); and 5) DSP. We have found that, in the newer devices, the cross sections for each of these resources are unique. This type of information could play an important role in determining how a designer mitigates specific resource types.
For each data point, it is also necessary to determine the amount of error in the data point. For cross-sectional data, the error is often expressed as
where fluence is the measure of the number of ions that irradiated the device in a set at a time, θ is the angle of the test fixture to the beam, and events is the count of the radiation-induced faults. There can be significant errors introduced by a number of sources, such as bad beam dosimetry, contaminants in the beam line, and the systematic test fixture error. Therefore, within the radiation effects field, even meticulously collected data can be off by a factor of 2.
3) Combining Test Results:
After each data set is analyzed, the data are combined to give a view of how energy affects the sensitivity of the device to SEUs. Proton-based and heavyion-based results are separated into different graphs. We have also found that separating angular data from normal incidence data is often helpful, as angular data can often be confusing when only represented as an increase in effective energy. By standard, data sets are plotted in lognormal graphs. The data are traditionally fitted to a Weibull curve. This fitting can be done either through MATLAB or by hand using a least-squared fit.
When plotted, two interesting characteristics of cross sections become apparent, namely, an onset threshold and a sat- uration cross section. The onset threshold indicates the lowest energy or energy equivalent needed to cause an SEU or a SEFI, which can be less than 1 MeV · cm 2 /mg for heavy ions. The saturation cross section indicates the maximum sensitivity to the radiation source and often does not saturate in modern devices due to the presence of MBUs [17] .
C. Static Test Results
In this section, we will present data from a number of tests that we have performed using this methodology. The parts we have tested are listed in Table I . Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Xilinx Radiation Testing Consortium have extensively tested these parts in both proton and heavyion radiation. Information with regard to energy, angles, and fluence can be found in [17] and [18] . To determine the quality of our data collection procedures, we estimated the probability of coincident two-bit upsets in our data sets using the Monte Carlo technique described in Section III-A3. Table II shows the worst-case probability that the readback data will have coincident SBUs based on the worst-case number of upset bits per device in each device's data set. Table III has a list of SEU bit cross sections for proton, and Fig. 10 shows the SEU bit cross sections for heavy ions for Virtex family devices. Note that the sensitivity to heavy ions is five to seven orders of magnitude larger than protons. Each of these devices has been designed with progressively smaller transistor geometries, but there is not much difference between any of the cross-section values. While shrinking the transistor size reduces the likelihood of striking a transistor with ionizing radiation, shrinking the transistors also reduces critical charge necessary for changing a value. Therefore, shrinking transistor sizes will not necessarily decrease the sensitivity of the device to radiation. Table IV lists the frequency of MBUs in protons, and Fig. 11 shows the frequency of MBUs for heavy ions for Virtex family devices. Both of the proton and heavy-ion data sets have shown that MBUs have become more frequent in the newer devices. Fig. 11 also shows how the MBU frequency increases with energy. Figs. 12 and 13 show how the size of the MBUs also increases with size as energy increases. Furthermore, Fig. 14 shows how the MBUs increase as the device is rotated. Fig. 15 shows how the bit cross section changes with angle. Although the effective energy of the beam increases with angle, most of the data points show an increase in bit cross section that is not proportional to the increase effective energy. If plotted with normal incidence data points, these data points could be very confusing.
Finally, Figs. 16 and 17 show a distribution of events analyzed by the affected resource. The first bar in both figures shows the percentage of space each resource takes on the device. In Fig. 16 , one should note that, as the energy increases, more of the events occur in the BRAM, although these memory cells comprise approximately 30% of the device. In testing, we found that the saturation cross section of the BRAM was the largest of all resources, which is causing this resource to dominate the events in the saturation region. However, the opposite is happening in Fig. 17 with the Virtex-5. In the saturation region, the events are almost evenly distributed with their percentage of space on the device. In testing, we found that the different resources had different onset thresholds but that the saturation cross sections were not that much dissimilar. Furthermore, unlike previous devices, the memory cells devoted to routing for all resources were standardized. Due to our choice of categorization of memory cells, this type of information is obscured. As these categories are somewhat arbitrary, in the future, we can change the analysis software to differently categorize the resources.
D. Error Rates in Space
Essentially, every orbital scenario is different with regard to radiation effects. Therefore, it is necessary to perform mission analysis and planning to make orbital SEU rate estimations. A complete discussion of on-orbit SEU rate estimation is beyond the scope of this paper, but we will provide a few references for further information and study in the following paragraphs.
Two of the more accessible tools that are commonly used for on-orbit SEU rate estimation are the Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics Rev. 96 (CREME96) tool suite developed by the Cosmic Ray Physics Section at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the commercial tool suite SpaceRad developed by Space Radiation Associates. SpaceRad provides a nice GUI around the older NRL CREME and other models. Both tools use the AP8 trapped proton model, which was developed by Dr. J. I. Vette and Dr. D. M. Sawyer, first at the Aerospace Corporation and later at National Aeronautics and Space Administration's National Space Science Data Center (NSSDC) under the Space Environment and Effects Program. Like most models, the AP8 models have some limitations that preclude them from being particularly accurate [19] - [21] . If a designer needs more accurate results, there are a few tools and models at the CREME96 website. Fig. 18 shows a series of CREME96 calculations for the Virtex-I device. This figure shows how the error rate increases with altitude until approximately 3000 km. This figure also shows how the error rates differ for the entire device for unmitigated and mitigated designs. These data show that the static cross section used to determine the upper bound on the error rate is the worst-case scenario. The dynamic cross section for unmitigated and mitigated designs is much lower, which makes these devices usable for most mission scenarios. Fig. 18 . CREME96 SEU calculations for a design on the XQVR300 platform using various forms of mitigation [22] .
IV. DYNAMIC TESTING
The best practices for FPGA-based spacecraft design encourage the use of TMR in the user circuit to mask SEUinduced errors on the FPGA, in addition to error detection and correction of data stored in the device's programming memory. Applying TMR can be an error-prone process, and in some cases, the designers are unable to apply "full" TMR to the user circuit due to device size constraints. The user circuit needs to be tested prelaunch to determine whether it is working as expected, including whether TMR has effectively been applied and whether the reliability requirements are met.
The current "gold standard" for pre-launch testing of user circuits is validation through radiation experiments at a particle accelerator. When using this "gold standard," the designer has the choice of using either a proton or a heavy-ion accelerator, the most likely ionized particles to cause SEUs while in orbit. Fully space-qualifying a design could take days worth of time and tens of thousands of dollars at an accelerator to exercise all of the possible radiation-induced failure modes and find all of the problems with a user design. Since radiation-induced faults are statistical in nature, it may be too expensive to get good test coverage and also difficult to understand how the output errors correlate to design flaws in the user design. We have found that fault injection and modeling tools are much better at providing feedback about specific design flaws to the designer. Available are a fault injection tool-the SEU Emulator-and a modeling tool-the Scalable Tool for the Analysis of Reliable Circuits (STARC)-that can be used by FPGA designers to augment radiation experiments. By using these tools, accelerator testing is only needed for final prelaunch validation of the user design.
A. Dynamic Testing Background
SEUs usually affect the user circuit in one of two ways: 1) by changing circuit functionality or 2) by changing the flow of data through the circuit. SRAM bits that cause output errors when affected by an SEU are called sensitive programming data bits or, more simply, sensitive bits. Good testing should help designers quantify and locate sensitive bits that are the result of untriplicated logic, placement-related issues, and the application of TMR. In a fully TMR-protected circuit, SEUs in the user logic should not affect the output data in the system, with the exception of some occasional placement-related issues that depend on how the circuit is implemented on the device [15] . In a design that only has TMR partially applied to the design (Partially TMR-Protected), there will also be untriplicated logic and routing that will have some sensitive bits. In the remaining portion of this section, we will discuss how SEUs partially and fully affect TMR-protected user circuits.
1) Fully TMR-Protected User Circuits:
In fully TMRprotected user circuits, no single-bit SEUs should cause output errors, unless TMR was not properly applied or problems with logical constants exist. We have found that TMR-protected systems can be vulnerable to SEUs if the implementation of the logical constants is not carefully controlled. These logical constants are frequently used to tie off unused resource inputs, such as the "carry in" to ripple carry logic or unused address lines to a memory. With newer devices, MBUs, where a single SEU causes multiple bits to fail, have become more common [17] , particularly with heavy ions. We have observed MBUinduced TMR defeats [15] . These TMR defeats appear to be strongly influenced by placement issues.
2) Partially TMR-Protected User Circuits: When TMR is only applied to a portion of a circuit due to resource constraints, SEUs can affect two different areas of the circuit: 1) untriplicated logic and 2) untriplicated routing. Partially TMRprotected designs could also have all of the placement-related issues that affect fully TMR-protected designs, as previously described in this paper.
First, any untriplicated logic could cause output errors to manifest when the logic is corrupted with an SEU. For example, Fig. 19(a) shows a programmable logic element, called a lookup table (LUT) , that is implementing a four-input AND function. If the one bit that defines the "true" condition has an SEU, the result is a constant-zero function. Sometimes SEUs in untriplicated logic can logically be masked by the data the circuit is executing. For our aforementioned example, most of the possible input combinations will return the correct output. If the data in the system never exercise the one input combination that causes the error to manifest, the error will logically be masked. Output errors that manifest from untriplicated logic can only be fixed by changing the design. Therefore, the number of sensitive bits due to unprotected logic is immutable to how the user circuit is placed on the device by the design flow tools, although the location of these bits might change by rerunning the tools.
A second set of output errors in partially TMR-protected designs stem from the programmable routing network in the untriplicated parts of the design. SEUs in the routing network change the flow of data through the circuit. For example, an SEU in the routing network could cause an input to a LUT to float. Unlike untriplicated logic, some of the SEUs in the routing network can be influenced by the design flow tools, which determine how the user circuit is placed and routed on the device. Within blocks of untriplicated logic, the design flow tools could affect the number and location of sensitive bits in the routing network by lengthening/shortening routes or changing their location on the device.
Sometimes, the logic in a design might completely be triplicated, but some or all of the input signals might not be due to the lack of input/output resources. While the input data signals will be triplicated once the data are registered for the first time, the clock and reset trees will remain untriplicated. SEUs in the programmable routing along the main trunks of the clock and reset trees are very likely to affect the entire circuit, but SEUs in the leaves of these trees will often be masked if only one module in the TMR-protected design is affected. The number and location of sensitive bits can be affected by placement but cannot be eliminated through rerunning the placement tools.
B. Modeling Tools
Traditionally, designers of many types of systems have discovered using modeling tools for assessing reliability useful. These tools allow the designers to focus on creating accurate models of their systems, instead of focusing on how to calculate the reliability. Since FPGA user circuits already have accurate functional models in terms of hardware descriptions and netlists, the right modeling tool can directly leverage these descriptions for reliability analysis, enabling the detection and correction of design flaws in the design phase, where fixing flaws is significantly less expensive.
Traditionally, circuit reliability has been determined using purely analytical approaches [23] or techniques that model Boolean networks as probabilistic systems [24] - [27] . These modeling techniques represent circuits as probabilistic transfer matrices, stochastic Petri-nets, Markov chains, or Bayesian networks. These analytical approaches have been found to be error prone and computationally complex for the analysis of large designs. Similarly, a number of limitations have been identified for many traditional modeling-based approaches. First, model and input data set creation greatly increase the time commitment of using these tools. Transforming circuits into intermediate probabilistic system models is an additional computationally complex task. The complexity of calculating the circuit reliability also exponentially grows with the circuit size and the number of input vector sets, and the computation can take a prohibitively long time to finish. One solution to these limitations is the SETRA tool [28] , which directly addresses the state space issues and automated model generation.
For these reasons, traditional tools are not well suited for the size of designs used in most FPGA systems. All of these limitations have led to the development of the STARC tool, which specifically addresses the limitations of model creation, input data sets, and computational complexity with the following solutions:
1) industry-standard Electronic Design Interchange Format
(EDIF) representation of a circuit as the input model; 2) no input vector sets; 3) memoization to reduce computational complexity; and 4) combinatorial reliability calculations.
By using the EDIF circuit representation, the designer can assess the reliability of a circuit during the design process, even if the design is not complete, the design does not work, or the hardware is not available. Without the use of input vector sets, reliability is determined through the probability of device or input failure and is not dependent on specific input data sets. Without input data sets, the reliability of subcircuits is determined by type, such as a two-bit adder, and memoized for reuse. In this manner, large-scale circuits are analyzed in a fraction of the time required by traditional approaches, making design exploration more worthwhile.
There are, however, a few disadvantages to this approach. First, since EDIF does not contain information about the routing and the placement on the device, routing reliability is currently statistically estimated from case studies of routing placement. Furthermore, there is currently no way to assess placementrelated issues, such as MBU-induced TMR defeats. We are currently working on a solution for this limitation for designs that have gone all the way through the design flow. Second, without input vector sets, logic masking cannot be taken into account, and STARC estimates the worst-case failure rate. While this value may be lower than the value determined by other tools [29] , STARC provides a useful lower bound on the circuit's reliability.
By using the EDIF circuit representation, the hierarchy in the circuit should be preserved. In particular, STARC can readily exploit memoization by memoizing the reliability of subcircuits and reusing the reliability values for subcircuits of the same type. This reuse allows the computation to polynomially, instead of exponentially, grow. This hierarchical nature allows circuits to be examined at the highest level of abstraction or the most minute level of detail. STARC automatically determines the appropriate level of the hierarchy that needs to be explored. An example of this hierarchy is shown in Fig. 20 . In this example, the reliability of components C1-C4 is first determined, memoized, and then used to determine the reliability of the entire circuit.
During hierarchical exploration, dependence graphs for each primary output at each level of the hierarchy are determined. The dependence graph has all of the subcircuits between the output and the reachable inputs. Since not all logic or inputs are reachable from every output, this technique removes unrelated logic from the reliability calculation. Once the dependence graph for an output is determined, the reliability can be calculated. In unmitigated designs, the quantity of sensitive bits is the total area of the dependence graph, i.e.,
A(O)
where A(X) is the sensitive area of X (where X is either a wire or a cell), and C = {C 0 , . . . , C m } is the set of cells that can be reached from output wire O. The reliability of basic architectural elements, such as LUTs and user flip-flops, are predetermined and are statically loaded when STARC starts. STARC was designed to help designers find problems in the application of TMR. For mitigated circuits, the sensitive area is confined to the part of the design that is not triplicated, as triplication will mask errors as long as there is one voter for each redundant module. There are cases where the design flow tools (in particular synthesis tools) will alter the circuit so that the TMR modules are no longer functionally equivalent or independent. In these cases, two modules will share a partial calculation with the third module, and the shared partial calculation becomes a single point of failure. Feedback loops in TMR-protected systems are also sensitive to persistent errors [30] and need to use triplication and voters to break the feedback loops. If the feedback loops are not handled in this manner, the feedback loop's state will not be able to autonomously resynchronize after the SEU is removed. In this scenario, while the first SEU in the feedback loop will be masked, another SEU in the feedback loop is not guaranteed to be masked.
In all of these cases, STARC provides warnings and information about the design to the designer. The output of the tool provides the designer a list of subcircuits that are untriplicated, as well as warnings about potential single points of failures from functionally nonequivalent modules and logical constants. Since EDIF is tightly coupled to the circuit design, the designer should be able to directly use STARC's output to find and fix the design flaws in the user circuit.
C. Fault Injection Testing
Once a design is completed and hardware is available, it is possible to move on to fault injection. Unlike modeling tools, fault injection works with the actual hardware implementation of the user circuit, allowing placement-related issues to be assessed. If designed well, a fault injection tool should have good fidelity to accelerator testing and on-orbit behavior, since the hardware and the operational behavior mimic actual usage. Finally, we would like to note that fault injection on the actual "flight" hardware is highly desirable since it is more likely to mimic or illustrate the consequences of individual upsets.
Fault injection is possible, because the interfaces that control device programming (or configuration) are accessible to the designer. These interfaces can be used by the designer to purposefully corrupt the programming data to mimic SEUs in programming data. LANL designed one of the first fault injection testbeds for FPGAs with the SLAAC1-V SEU Emulator [31] . Since then, many other organizations have created them [14] , [32] , [33] . We have also gone on to make other versions of our fault injection tool to support newer hardware devices and support MBU testing.
Fault injection tools for FPGAs all have the same basic algorithm, as shown in Fig. 21 . With this algorithm, faults can be injected throughout the entire programming data. It is important to run a large number of input vectors through the system after the fault is injected to avoid logical error masking. Since running a complete set of test vectors is often infeasible, our SEU Emulator randomly generates input vectors so that better coverage is possible by running multiple tests on the same design. Each test provides coverage for 250 000-500 000 test vectors. It is also feasible to run a complete set of test vectors for limited portions of the circuit. Resetting and resynchronizing the user circuit after the SEU is removed is also important so that the effects of each emulated SEU are kept independent from others. Independent trials ensure that errors are properly attributed to the right programming data bit and that a latent bad state from one fault injection iteration does not affect the next one.
There are usually two types of fault injection systems based on whether one or two FPGAs are required. In our SEU Emulator tool, two FPGAs are used, each hosting the same user design. Faults are injected into the design-under-test FPGA and then run in lockstep with the same input vectors with the golden FPGA, which receives the same input vectors. The advantage of this system is that sharing input vectors, detecting output errors, and testing the system for resynchronization are very easy. The disadvantage is the complexity of designing the lockstep system.
In the single FPGA fault injection systems, the input vectors are run through the system twice: once without fault injection and once with fault injection. The advantage of this system is that it takes less hardware and is easier to design than a lockstep system, but the disadvantage is that the input vectors and correct output vectors need to be saved in the system. Furthermore, determining miscompares must be done as a separate process, which could be costly in terms of execution time.
In general, a good fault injection system should be able to handle different types of user circuits. With many fault injection systems, the number of clock and reset pins, the width of input and output buses, and the pin locations are often set. Due to these restrictions, sometimes, the user design has to be changed to fit the fault injection system, which can reduce the usefulness of fault injection. On occasion, we have found some cases that do not lend themselves to fault injection. In these cases, the use of modeling tools is even more important.
Once fault injection is completed, the SEU locations need to be tied back to the design. If fault injection only reports a handful of errors, the designers can decide if the user circuit meets the reliability requirements for the system and decide if further design exploration to fix design flaws is unnecessary. Unlike when using STARC, tying design problems found through fault injection to the design can be quite difficult and time consuming. While the fault injection tool returns the locations of sensitive bits, most designers do not know how to translate that location into a physical location on the device. If the physical location is determined, it is possible to use a Xilinx design flow tool, called FPGA Editor, to determine what part of the user circuit is in that location. There are times, however, that even knowing the part of the design that is causing the problem does not help. Since many errors manifest in the routing network of TMR-protected designs, it is possible that the fault is caused by a signal that is passing through a routing switch, rather than an error in the user logic.
D. Accelerator Testing
One of the advantages of doing accelerator testing after the use of fault injection and modeling tools is that it better prepares the designers for accelerator testing. To this end, the designers should know the areas of the circuit design that should cause output errors from the modeling tools and know the locations of these faulty areas through fault injection. Furthermore, if the designer has used a lockstep fault injection tool, the fault injection hardware can be used as the test fixture for the accelerator tests. In addition, the lockstep fault injection software can be used as part of the accelerator test fixture with minor modifications. If a lockstep system was not used for fault injection, a test fixture that can easily detect output errors is highly desirable so that real-time feedback is available during the test to ensure that the test is properly functioning. A number of FPGAs will be needed for the test, since the parts are only guaranteed to properly operate up to 100 krd of ionizing dose.
The algorithm for the software aspect of the test fixture is very similar to the fault injection tool's algorithm. Instead of artificially injecting faults, however, the particle accelerator will be injecting radiation-induced SEUs. Unlike fault injection, controlling the number of upsets that occur during one loop of the algorithm is more difficult. SEU removal and SEUinduced SEFIs that affect the functionality of the entire device complicate testing. These three problems will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
The arrival time of radiation-induced faults is a Poisson random process. As the designer will want to reduce the probability of multiple independent upsets (MIUs) causing an output error, the beam's flux is tuned so that, on average, only one SEU occurs per algorithm loop. Even still, Poisson statistics tell us that, even if the beam's flux is tuned to one SEU per algorithm loop, there is a 37% chance that no SEUs occur, a 37% chance that one SEU occurs, and a 26% chance that two or more SEUs occur during the given time period. Since not all SEUs cause output errors and only a few sensitive bits might exist, it can take some time for errors to manifest. The formula for determining the time interval for one output error to manifest is
where N OE is the number of samples until an output error, N bits is the number of sensitive bits, N device is the total number of bits in the device, T s is the time length for each sample, and T OE is the average time span until an output error. Quickly removing SEUs is important so that the user circuit can recover before the next SEU occurs. There are two ways to remove an SEU during an accelerator test: First, the SRAM FPGA can completely be reprogrammed through offline programming, where the FPGA is taken offline for the express purpose of reconfiguring the device. Taking the device offline tends to be costly in terms of time but is often needed in the case of SEFIs, where full reprogramming of the device is the only reliable method for restoring the FPGA to a known functional state. A second approach available to Xilinx SRAM FPGAs is the use of online programming capabilities. In this case, the FPGA remains operational while its programming data are repaired. Using online reprogramming, it is possible either to completely rewrite all of the programming data or to only fix the portions that have SEUs. This later case is safer since it affects the least amount of programming data at a time and since the FPGA's programming circuitry can be affected by SEUs. To reduce the time required to identify an SEU and fix it, we recommend the use of external SEU detection hardware as opposed to software.
After the accelerator test is completed, the results need to be examined so that correlations between output errors and known sensitive bits can be determined. Since the SEUs in accelerator testing do not uniformly present themselves in the system or at specified time intervals, correlating output errors to specific SEU locations can be a challenge. In some cases, the output error follows the SEU by several algorithm loops, and other times, the reporting software will output the existence of the output error before the SEU location. On other occasions, some output errors need to be dropped from the data set, such as when the incidence of MIUs is the cause of the output error. Oftentimes, all of the results around a SEFI event will need to be ignored, since removing the SEFI is time consuming, and the system will likely report output errors for several iterations until the circuit state resynchronizes.
As long as the user circuit that is being tested is the same user circuit tested in fault injection, the results from fault injection can be used to disambiguate the accelerator test results. Due to the problems described with attributing SEUs to output errors, the most effective approach for analyzing accelerator results is to look at several SEU locations before and after the output error in the log. This "window" of SEU locations can then be compared to fault injection results to determine if any of these SEU locations caused an output error in fault injection. While this method can usually help a designer correlate output errors with fault injection results, some output errors cannot completely be correlated. In some cases, the errors are due to SEUs in user memory, such as flip-flops, and not due to programming data upsets. The number of these types of errors can be predicted based on the amount of user memory used in the design and the susceptibility of these memory elements to SEUs. In other cases, the accumulation of errors in the circuit state caused the output error. For these cases, sometimes, part of an accelerator test can be "played back" using the fault injection tool, where the tool uses the accelerator log to inject faults in specific locations in a particular order. Through this attribution process, the designer can determine whether the output error can be explained and whether further design exploration is needed to address potential design flaws.
For fully or mostly mitigated designs, accelerator testing should be uneventful, and the user circuit should be able to operate for minutes or longer without any output errors. For example, using (16) , if fault injection only found 100 sensitive bits in a device with 75 million bits, at one algorithm loop per second, the first output error is only guaranteed to randomly occur within a 208-h time span. Some designers will do multiple rounds of tests with different flux levels and different durations. In particular, one test might have a very low flux over several hours, mimicking average operation in orbit, and another test might have a very high flux over a couple of minutes, mimicking solar flare conditions or to otherwise reduce test time. If, at the end of these tests, the design is able to operate either error free or within the availability requirements, the design is considered space ready.
If the error rate is much higher than that indicated by the fault injection tool, either the flux could be too high or there might be problems with either fault injection or accelerator test fixtures. When designing new fault injection and accelerator test fixtures, it is important to test the setup by correlating output errors to the source of the errors to ensure that fault injection works, as well as correlating the results of fault injection and the accelerator tests. If the results cannot be correlated, then the methodologies for both systems need to be examined.
E. Dynamic Testing Results
In this section, we will compare the use of these three methodologies on a circuit. The circuit, i.e., an adder tree, is fully triplicated and was originally designed to test for placement-related issues due to both MBUs and logical constants. This design was implemented using a Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA (XC2V1000). All three methodologies were used in this design. In the following paragraphs, we will describe the amount of time, the quality of the results, and the cost of using these methodologies.
In terms of time, STARC is comparatively much faster than the other two methods. Within a minute, the tool returned the result that the design was properly triplicated and with warnings that placement-related issues could exist from logical constants. As STARC cannot currently estimate the placement-related issues, it is unable to estimate how many bits in the design could cause output errors. In terms of cost, STARC is free to government users.
In terms of test coverage, the SEU Emulator was much more complete than the other two methods. With fault injection, we were able to find 285 single-bit SEU locations, 18 733 two-bit SEU locations, 11 264 three-bit SEU locations, and 19 464 fourbit SEU locations that cause the design to output bad data. Each pass through the fault injection test takes 2 h/run, and each MBU test is a separate test. As the MBU tests are run with specific MBU shapes based on our analysis of how MBUs affect the Virtex-II, we were able to constrain the MBU tests to the six most common shapes. In all, fault injection tests took 14 h for the seven tests. In terms of cost, the fault injection hardware is about $6000, and the software is free to government users.
As validation for both of these tests, we did a 2-h-long test at the University of Indiana Cyclotron Facility's proton accelerator. During this test, we were able to observe 50 output errors, of which 21 were attributed to SEFIs, 13 were attributed to MIUs, and 16 were attributed to the two phenomena that we were looking for. Of the 16 output errors, 88% were able to later correlate to known fault injection error locations. At three algorithm iterations per second, we would have been able to test all of the single-bit errors in no less than 16 days, assuming that no single-bit fault location was exercised multiple times. As is, we were able to test at a higher flux to be able to considerably shorten the time frame of the test. Since the MBU-related issues have only a 2% chance of occurring due to proton radiation, completing the two-bit test would have taken over two years. In terms of cost, we were able to use the hardware and software from fault injection, and we only had to pay the accelerator fees of $1200 for 2 h of test time and $500 for the FPGA. Had we completed the single-bit test, we would have to pay for at least 385 h of testing and 192 FPGAs for a total cost of $288 000.
Since we considerably shortened our accelerator test, the initial cost of the hardware for the fault injection tool is the highest of the three test methodologies. Had we done a complete validation of the user circuit, however, the accelerator test would have been the most expensive. In addition, it should be noted that the cost of the fault injection tool is amortized across all of the fault injection tests and the accelerator testing. Since the hardware infrastructure can be reused an unlimited number of times, if the FPGA is not irradiated, the cost is reasonable. When the test coverage is factored in, the amount of time and cost invested in the fault injection tool is the best option. While fault injection should never replace accelerator testing, the accelerator test was shortened when we were able to confirm our fault injection results. We also believe that using STARC decreased the overall time commitment and iteration that takes place in fault injection and accelerator testing. Finally, since the design had TMR properly applied to the circuit from the beginning, which was confirmed throughout the testing, there was no need to determine what was wrong with our design.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented methodologies for both static and dynamic testing. The static test methodology included a discussion of test fixtures for radiation testing and data analysis. Our static methodology includes testing the devices for MBUs such that the data are not contaminated with coincident SBUs. We have also highlighted some of our static test results for the Xilinx Virtex family devices. The dynamic test methodology introduced a three-tiered methodology that finds design flaws in FPGA user circuits and locates the source of the faults on the FPGA. One methodology used the circuit representation to find design flaws through modeling. The second methodology used fault injection to locate how the design flaws translated to physical locations on the FPGA. The final method was an accelerator test to validate the previous results. We have also shown how these three methodologies compared in terms of test coverage, time, and cost. While the modeling tool is the fastest, fault injection is the best methodology in terms of cost and test coverage.
